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What determines the allocation of tasks among government agencies?
This paper develops a formal model of task allocation that argues that
jurisdictions are strategically designed to achieve legislative goals.  In the model,
agencies choose unobservable policies, and political outcomes are a noisy
indicator of these choices.  The legislature therefore faces a compliance issue
when the agencies’ policy preferences are different from its own.  The legislature
exerts control by defining agency jurisdictions, setting ex ante budgets and
choosing ex post contractual inducements.  The principal result is that tasks will
be consolidated under a single roof when that agency prefers lower levels of
policy than the legislature.  In other cases, separating tasks prevents resources
from being allocated in a manner undesirable for the legislature.
1 The author wishes to thank David Baron and Jonathan Bendor for useful discussions.  Justin Adams,
Sean Gailmard, Tim McKeown, Ken Shotts, James Snyder, panel participants at the 1997 Midwest Political Science
Association Meetings, and two anonymous referees also provided helpful comments.  All mistakes are of course my
own.
1.  Introduction
A fundamental issue in the design of bureaucratic systems is the assignment of tasks to
agencies.  Between 1924 and 1973, Congress established 246 agencies, many of which assumed
responsibility for new tasks (Kaufman 1976).  But during that period Congress also assigned
countless new tasks to existing agencies, some of which were accepted happily while others
generated resistance.  What accounts for these variations?  Federal and state agencies today
collectively handle a multitude of tasks, but to a large degree the rationales for particular
configurations of agency jurisdictions remain unclear.
Perhaps the most obvious explanation for how tasks are allocated is that they are arranged
according to technical criteria.  For any new task, an existing organization familiar with related
tasks would seem likely to perform it most effectively.  Thus, tasks involving naval warfare
should be assigned to the Navy, tasks related to retirement insurance should be assigned to the
Social Security Administration, and completely new and unrelated tasks should be assigned to
new agencies.  While the argument no doubt characterizes an important incentive for the
designers of bureaucratic jurisdictions, it (perhaps surprisingly) fails to capture a great many
interesting cases.  Technical similarities are often difficult to discern ex ante.  It was not obvious
to policy-makers in the 1930s, for example, whether food and drug advertising should be
regulated by the Food and Drug Administration or the Federal Trade Commission (Quirk 1980).
Moreover, the argument seems hard-pressed to explain many cases of agency specialization ex
post.  Why, for instance, are alcohol, tobacco, and firearms enforcement separated from the Drug
Enforcement Agency?  Finally, even in some cases where the technical explanation works, more
general conclusions about the extent to which technology matters remain elusive.  As the Social
Security Administration’s ineffective assumption of the Disability Insurance program illustrates
(Derthick 1990), it is often clear retrospectively that agencies have difficulties performing new
and different tasks.  Yet other agencies, like the Forestry Service, have historically performed
seemingly vast portfolios of dissimilar tasks with great success (Kaufman 1960).
The prevalence of such technically counterintuitive task assignments naturally leads to a
consideration of alternative rationales for task allocation.  One important argument is that an
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optimal jurisdictional allocation might entail separating tasks which share technical similarities
across agencies.  By making bureaucratic systems redundant, political principals can insure
themselves against random failures in individual agencies (Landau 1969).  While this perspective
does not embody a comprehensive theory of task allocation, its amenability to formalization has
resulted in the valuable theoretical contribution of making explicit the incentives of political
principals (Bendor 1985, Heimann 1993).
The Strategic Allocation of Agency Tasks
This paper adopts a third perspective, which differs from redundancy theory in two ways.
First, instead of asking when a task is assigned to multiple agencies, it considers when an agency
will be assigned multiple tasks.  Second, it additionally considers the strategic incentives of
agencies and other relevant interests in the political process.
These topics are explored to some degree by two prominent works.  Moe (1989) argues
that a task’s bureaucratic home reflects the preferences of the interest groups and legislators
concerned with its performance.  For example, an enacting coalition might shield a task from
future political attacks by placing it within a “friendly” department, or by assigning it to an
independent commission.  Wilson (1989) attempts to explain why even expansionist bureaus
frequently shun new responsibilities.2  The Federal Bureau of Investigation, for instance, resisted
participation in narcotics investigations, and the Navy and Air Force have historically neglected
sealift and airlift, respectively.  Far from being aberrations, these tasks have a clear technical
relation with the activities of their host agencies, as well as an ability to inflate budgets.
Nevertheless, such tasks were resisted because they might cause agencies to lose their “sense of
mission,” impose additional costs, and introduce additional opportunities for failure.3
These arguments are informal and leave some room for interpretation, but they establish
that the placement of tasks is of critical importance to its supporters and opponents, as well as to
the agencies themselves.  Further, they suggest some of the central features of a theory of task
allocation.  Because task sets affect agencies’ performance incentives, and designers anticipate
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2 Perhaps echoing some popular attitudes in America, a staple of economic analyses of bureaucratic
politics is the assumption that agencies maximize budgets or size (Tullock 1965, Niskanen 1971).  In fact, this
assumption is often accepted as the cardinal distinction between bureaus and firms (see Miller and Moe 1983).
3 In a somewhat different vein from the argument developed here, Wilson also argues that adding tasks
can introduce competing agencies or additional principals (e.g., more Congressional oversight committees).  The
latter scenario is addressed to some degree by common agency models (e.g., Dixit 1995).
these incentives, jurisdictional allocations are usefully analyzed as equilibrium phenomena.  The
game theoretic model developed here will therefore address a host of important but as yet
unanswered questions.4  How exactly do multiple tasks affect the incentives of agencies?  Is
compliance better assured by handing a task to a new agency (or commission) or assigning it to a
“friendly” agency?  Would legislative principals attempt to induce better performance out of
“unfriendly” agencies by merging them with “friendly” ones?  By answering these questions, the
model will also aid the construction of empirical tests.
Explaining Task Allocations
The model is centered around a hierarchical relationship between agencies and their most
important principal, the legislature.5  As Wilson and Moe suggest, this environment is
characterized by numerous tensions.  The actors’ policy preferences may diverge because
legislatures do not fully control the appointment of bureau heads, or because of pressure from an
assigned task’s constituencies (e.g., Hammond 1979).  Combined with imperfect monitoring, the
bureaucratic allocation of resources can then pose serious compliance issues.6  A natural
framework, then, for analyzing problems with this structure is the principal-agent contracting
model (Dixit 1995, de Figueiredo 1998).
Unfortunately, this approach presents a major difficulty in the context of agency
budgeting.  A contractual payment does not constrain the ex ante feasibility of an agent’s policy
choices, but rather serves as ex post compensation.  However, a crucial part of a legislature’s
“Power of the Purse” is the ability to use the budget not only to reward agencies but also to
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4 To see why formalization of these insights is necessary, consider Wilson’s explanations for why
agencies resist new tasks.  First, the “sense of mission” argument is susceptible to the same criticisms as the
assessment of technical similarities between tasks.  Second, the cost argument cannot explain why a legislature
would not fund additional tasks adequately.  It is possible that budgeters operate under a fiscal illusion when facing
multi-task agencies, perhaps in the form of a lag between the time at which additional costs are incurred and when a
sufficient budget is provided.  But if a legislature were well-apprised of policy costs, the real problem for the agency
might well be a loss of “slack” rather than an increase in costs.  Finally, policy failures are certainly bad for bureaus,
but the argument lacks a discussion of the implications of failure.  Without some notion of the punishment scheme
that an agency faces, it is difficult to draw conclusions about whether it would resist an additional task.
5 See Kaufman (1981).  Legislatures are the most natural choice for agencies’ political principals for this
model, since they exert direct control over agencies’ budgets and task sets.  An interesting extension would be to
explore the addition of other principals such as interest groups and the president.
6 The model therefore does not feature incomplete information.  However, it is worth considering the
possibility that a consolidated agency would be better informed than the principal about the proper allocation of
resources.  Such a model might resemble models of delegation under incomplete information (e.g., Epstein and
O’Halloran 1999).
delimit their feasible actions ex ante.
The game developed here is based on a contracting model, but it addresses this concern
by considering both ex ante and ex post controls.  It makes two assumptions about the policy
technology available to agencies.  First, budgets may be freely allocated across assigned
jurisdictions or consumed as slack.  This comports with the casual observation that agencies in
practice frequently have considerable leeway in exercising policy priorities.7  Second, utility
across tasks are additively separable.  Thus, there are no exogenous efficiency gains from
consolidating tasks.  This assumption allows the strategic aspect of task allocation to be studied
in isolation of technological factors.
In the game, the legislature first chooses whether to consolidate tasks under one agency,
or separate them into a set of single-task agencies.  It then sets a budget and a contract for each
agency.  The budget delimits ex ante an agency’s feasible policy space, while the contract
specifies the ex post payment to be delivered for each outcome in an agency’s jurisdiction.  Each
agency then chooses a costly policy that is feasible under its assigned budget, unobserved by the
legislature.8  Upon observing the outcomes of these policies (which are correlated with the policy
choices), the legislature delivers the promised contractual payments.  These payments may be
construed in a number of ways, such as less stringent oversight, greater program autonomy,
approval of friendly appointees, or favorable future budgetary treatment.9
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7 While legislatures often specify how funds are distributed across tasks, agencies that undertake complex
tasks have various methods of working around such requirements to satisfy urgent needs or pursue other policy
goals.  In the 1990s, for example, the California State Assembly and Senate attempted with limited success to
impose a new accounting system on the Department of Transportation (Caltrans) to ensure that it complied with
legislative spending wishes.  A report produced by the consultancy SRI International (1996: 15) concluded that
“Unfortunately, yet not unusually for government agencies, no consistent measure of output could be identified.
Furthermore, Caltrans had no set of overall department measures that disaggregated into division, functional unit,
project, and individual staff targets to be used as the basis for regularly tracking achieved performance versus target
and for annual performance reviews.”
8 This scenario accords particularly well with Wilson’s (1989) notion of craft agencies, or organizations
whose activities are difficult to observe, such as the Army Corps of Engineers or Food and Drug Administration.
Under these conditions, budgets assume a particularly important role because administrative rules (e.g., McCubbins,
Noll, and Weingast 1987) are less likely to be effective.
9 A further difficulty with contracting models is the assumption of commitment to the compensation (or
punishment) schedule.  This assumption is a non-trivial matter in political settings, where there are no courts to
make promises of payment credible.  Since agencies must request new budgets annually, it is sometimes justified as
a convenient way to incorporate the effects of repeated play in a single-period game (e.g., Bendor, Taylor, and Van
Gaalen 1987).  Nevertheless, it is sometimes unclear whether the behavior predicted by such a single-period game is
supportable in a non-cooperative context (see, e.g., Banks 1989).  It is possible to show, however, that the
equilibrium strategies of the game developed here are sustainable as the Nash equilibrium strategies of a repeated
game (proof available upon request from author).
Several non-obvious and testable predictions concerning the allocation of tasks result.
The equilibrium allocation depends on the relative effectiveness of the ex ante and ex post
controls, which in turn depend on the policy preferences of the players.  Consolidation allows the
principal to write a contract that disproportionately awards good performance on all tasks.  This
gives a multi-task agency a greater incentive to perform on all tasks than a contract that rewards
each task independently.  Thus if the legislature desires higher levels of output than the agency
on all tasks, it may be in her best interest to consolidate tasks.  Otherwise, if the legislature wants
less effort on a task, consolidation may distort the allocation of effort toward the less desired
task.  In this case, separation ensures that the ex ante budgets are not mis-allocated, and the
legislature can typically achieve her optimal policy on at least one task at minimum cost and with
no contractual payment.
The model complements a variety of formal work on task and resource allocation in
hierarchical relationships.  Its “hidden action” setup distinguishes it from previous game
theoretic models of agency budgeting, which assume informational asymmetries in a single-
period setting (Banks 1989, Banks and Weingast 1992) or observable policies in a repeated
setting (Silver 1996, Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast 1989).  The latter category of models
appeal to Folk Theorems to derive their results, showing that many policies are supportable in
equilibrium when actions are observable.  By comparison, the equilibrium budgets and policies
for each jurisdictional subgame in this model are unique.  The model also contrasts usefully with
contracting models.  Perhaps the most relevant work in this area is Holmstrom and Milgrom’s
(1991) study of multi-task agents, which finds that a principal will want to ban tasks that agents
value much more highly than the principal, since these tasks will divert the agents’ efforts
excessively.10  This result is similar in spirit to that of this paper, but the model developed here
differs in two ways.  First, all tasks are mandated by law, and so must be allocated to agents
somehow.  Second, the principal enjoys ex ante budget control, which powerfully affects her
ability to obtain optimal outcomes under some conditions.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 introduces the model and
characterizes the task allocation in the simple case where no ex post contracts are possible.  The
5
10 The model also finds that the cost of providing optimal task incentives leads a principal to assign agents
tasks that are similarly difficult to monitor.
full game is examined in Section 3, which also establishes some simple requirements for
effective ex post contracts.  In Section 4 I derive the main results, comparing the principal’s
anticipated payoff from consolidating policies to her payoff from assigning tasks to different
agencies.  Section 5 introduces a few empirical applications of the model’s central findings, and
Section 6 discusses the results and concludes.
2.  The Model
Environment and Sequence
The model is single-period game of imperfect information.  There are two tasks or policy
dimensions, the outcomes of which are represented by the random vector X = (X1, X2).  The
outcome for task i is either a success (Xi = 1) or failure (Xi = 0).  Outcomes are the result of a
two-element policy vector φ or φC, depending on the allocation of tasks.  It is assumed that φi ∈
[0, 1] and Pr{Xi = 1} = φi.  Policies are costly, as defined by the function c(φ) = ∑i ci(φi), where
ci(φi) = miφi
2.  The policy vector φC has identical properties.
There are two kinds of players; a political principal (P) and one or two agencies.  Each
player has linear preferences over policy outcomes and quasilinear utility over money.  P
receives one unit of utility for each success and zero otherwise.  She chooses payment schemes
for the agencies, but cannot directly affect outcomes.  Each agency handles at least one task,
though each task is handled by only one agency.  The agency in charge of task i receives wi for a
success on that task and zi for a failure.
11  This potential divergence in preferences conveniently
incorporates the influence of external parties (most notably the executive branch) on agencies.
As a result, an agency may exploit imperfect information to consume part of its budget as slack,
or allocate resources away from one task and toward another.12
The game sequence, depicted in stylized form in Figure 1, clarifies the incentives of these
players.  Before the first period, P chooses an allocation of tasks across agencies.  In particular,
she may either consolidate tasks under an existing agency that already performs another task, or
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11 Since wi and zi can be varied arbitrarily, normalizing P’s outcome payoffs at one and zero does not
sacrifice any generality.  Further, P’s strict preference for successes is innocuous, for if P’s payoff from failure were
greater than her payoff from success, then she need not deal with an agency to attain her most preferred outcome.
12 While slack pervades organizations (Cyert and March 1963), the preference for slack also complements
the policy preference assumption.  A bureaucrat with an ideal policy would ideally wish to spend just enough to
attain her most desired policy and keep the remainder as slack.
separate tasks by creating a new agency.  In the former case, or the consolidation subgame, one
agency (A) performs both tasks.  In the latter case, or the separation subgame, each task is
performed by separate agencies (A1, A2) who care only about their own budgets and policy
domains, and cannot transfer utility amongst themselves.  In this regime P effectively collects
payoffs from two independent games.
Following the jurisdictional allocation is a single cycle of budgeting and policy-making.
P chooses an ex ante budget BC ≥ 0 in the consolidation subgame or a budget vector B = (B1, B2)
in the separation subgame, where Bi ≥ 0 is the budget given to Ai.  P also chooses an ex post
compensation for each agency in the form of a contract, which links all possible observable
outcomes for that agency with a payment vector.  It is assumed that P can commit credibly to
delivering its announced payments.  For the consolidated agency, the contract vector is βC ≥ 0.  It
will be convenient to define the elements of βC as follows.  Let β00 represent the payment for
failures on both tasks, β10 the payment for success on task 1 only, β01 the payment for success on
task 2 only, and β11 the payment for success on both tasks.  In the separation subgame, P chooses
a contract βi = (βi
0, βi
1) ≥ 0 for each Ai, where βi
0 and βi
1 represents the payment for failure and
success, respectively.  The requirement that contractual payments be non-negative captures two
features of bureaucratic politics.  First, agencies do not have any resources other than those given
by their principals (this is in the spirit of the assumption of ex ante budgets), and so P’s ability to
extract payments out of the agency is highly constrained.  Second, individual bureaucrats have
reservation values for continuing their employment.13
The agencies observe the budget and contract choices and then adopt policies within their
jurisdictions, unobserved by P.  In the consolidation subgame, A chooses policy vector φC = (φ1
C,
φ2
C), while in the separation subgame each agency Ai chooses component φi of the policy vector
φ.  Agencies are subject to the constraints of their particular budgets: c(φC) ≤ BC for A, and ci(φi)
≤ Bi for Ai.  Agencies must consume any unexpended funds as slack.  Finally, Nature determines
policy outcomes X based on the selected policies, and P delivers its stated contractual payments.
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13 The assumption also prevents a trivial solution to the game: without it, P could induce an agency to
choose its ideal policy with an appropriately-chosen schedule of negative payments.


































In the consolidation subgame, the expected utilities for A and P are therefore:
uA(φC; BC, βC) = ∑i [wiφi
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C – β00(1 – φ1
C)(1 – φ2
C).
Similarly, the expected utilities for Ai and P in the separation subgame are:
uAi(φi; Bi, βi) = wiφi + zi(1 – φi) – ci(φi) + Bi + βi
1φi + βi
0(1 – φi)  for each Ai,
uP(B, β1, β2; φ) = ∑i [φi – Bi – βi
1φi – βi
0(1 – φi)].
Note that there are no income effects, so budgets affect policy choices only if they constrain
feasibility.
Subgame perfect Nash equilibria for this game are therefore characterized by an optimal
jurisdictional choice by P, along with budgets and contracts that maximize uP(BC, βC; φC) and
uP(B, β1, β2; φ).  Agency policy responses must maximize u
A(φC; BC, βC) and uAi(φi; Bi, βi), subject
to feasibility constraints.
For the subsequent analysis, it will be useful to define “unconstrained” ideal policies for
each player.  Let φP = arg max ∑i φi – ci(φi) be the policy P would choose if she paid for the
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policy herself.  By the concavity of P’s objective, φP is characterized by ∂ci/∂φi = 1 for each i at
an interior solution, and φi
P = 1 otherwise.  Likewise, let φA = arg max ∑i [φiwi + (1 – φi)zi – ci(φi)]
be the optimal policy vector for A if the budget constraint is slack.  Since A’s objective is
concave, φA is characterized by the first-order condition dci/dφi = wi – zi for each i at an interior
solution, so that marginal policy utility equals marginal policy cost in every dimension.  At a
corner solution, φi
A = 0 if wi ≤ zi and φi
A = 1 if dci(1)/dφi ≤ wi – zi.  Because A’s utility is separable
across dimensions, agency Ai’s ideal policy is identical to A’s ideal in dimension i.  Agency
policy preferences therefore do not depend on the jurisdictional allocation.  This effectively
assumes that the same forces generate agency preferences (e.g., interest group pressure)
regardless of whether tasks are consolidated.  It also implies that there are no economies of scope
to consolidation.  As a result, the motives for particular jurisdictional allocations in the model are
strategic, rather than economic.
The No-Contracting Case
As a baseline case, it will be helpful to derive jurisdictional assignments in the reduced
game in which P cannot write contracts.  In other words, suppose that contractual payments are
constrained to βi = 0 and β
C = 0 in their respective subgames.  For generality, I consider an
environment with n ≥ 1 tasks.
This game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.  Consider first the consolidation
subgame, where A chooses a policy φC = (φ1
C, …, φn
C).  Using backwards induction, A chooses
the following policy vector for any budget BC:
φC*(BC) ∈  arg max ∑i [φi
Cwi + (1 – φi
C)zi – ci(φi
C)] + BC,
subject to: c(φC) ≤ BC, φC ≥ 0, φC ≤ 1.
Call φC*(BC) the policy curve.  This curve defines the set of policies such that, for any two tasks,
the ratios of marginal utility and marginal cost are equal.14  Thus, policy vectors along it
maximize A’s return to effort.  As Figure 2 illustrates for the two-task case, this curve consists of
the tangent points between A’s policy indifference curves and the budget constraint when BC ≤
9
14 This is subject to the policies being “interior,” i.e., for i ≠ j, φi
C* ∈  (0, 1) and φj
C* ∈  (0, 1), which is
assured if φA < 1.  Then solving the constrained maximization, it is easily shown that along the policy curve, φi
C*/φj
C*
= mj(wi – zi)/mi(wj – zj).  As a result, the policy curve in the no-contracting case is linear if φ
A < 1.
c(φA).  Since A’s objective function is quasilinear and strictly concave, φC*(BC) is single-valued,
continuous and weakly increasing in BC.
Anticipating the policy response, the optimal budget BC* satisfies:
BC* ∈  arg max ∑i φi
C*(BC) – BC,  subject to: BC ≥ 0.
Thus, P chooses a budget that induces the policy on the policy curve that is “closest” to her ideal,
φP.  In general, this budget equates P’s marginal benefit from increasing the budget (possibly
resulting in higher policies) with her marginal cost.  It is easily shown that BC* is unique.  The
equilibrium of the consolidation subgame is thus characterized by the pair {BC*, φC*(BC*)}.





P’s policy indifference curve







Because of the simplicity of the functional forms, it is straightforward to derive closed
forms for equilibrium strategies.  However, this is not essential for the task allocation decision.
What matter are the boundaries of the policy curve and its implications for φC*(BC).  At one
extreme, it is clear that φC*(0) = 0.  At the other extreme, φC*(BC) = φA for BC ≥ c(φA), by the
quasilinearity of A’s preferences.  In general, φi
C*(BC) ∈  [0, φi
A] for all BC, since A’s utility is
additively separable and φi
A is his ideal choice (if feasible) for task i.  Thus, the equilibrium
budget satisfies BC* ≤ c(φA), and there is no slack in equilibrium (i.e., BC* = c(φC*(BC*))) because
A is either budget-constrained or not given any funds above c(φA).  The absence of slack implies
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that P strictly prefers higher policies along the policy curve as long as φC*(BC) ≤ φP.  If φP ≥ φA,
then the closest point to φP on the policy curve is φA: BC* = c(φA) and φC*(c(φA)) = φA.  For other
values of φP, P may choose an “interior” point on the policy curve (as in Figure 2).  Note that φP
cannot be the equilibrium policy unless it lies along the policy curve.
In the separation subgame, equilibrium budgets and policies are easier to characterize
because each Ai maximizes over one dimension and P’s payoffs are additively separable.  Thus,
each task may be addressed separately.  If φi
A ≥ φi
P (i.e., wi – zi ≥ 1), then φi
P lies along the policy


















Aggregating across tasks, the equilibrium policy vector satisfies φ* ≤ φP.15
Now consider P’s jurisdiction allocation problem.  From the above derivation, it is clear
that if φA ≤ φP, then φC* = φ* = φA and the jurisdictional allocation is inconsequential.  The
following result uses the above-mentioned properties of both subgames to show that in other
cases, P would prefer to separate tasks.
Proposition 1.  In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the n-task, no-contracting
jurisdictional allocation game, P separates tasks.  •
Proof.  Proofs of all Propositions and Comments may be found in the Appendix.
Thus without contracts, and without assuming increasing returns to scope from policy
production or other cost benefits, P cannot gain from consolidating any number of tasks.  Unless
P’s policy goals are all more ambitious than the agencies’, consolidation reduces her control of
budgetary resources across policies.  Consolidation restricts P to maximize over only one budget,
and hence over only the set of points along the policy curve.  This restriction passes much of the
surplus of the interaction to A.  By contrast, separating the tasks allows P to fine-tune budgets,
thereby protecting her from over-ambitious agencies.  The result perhaps accords with the casual
view that legislative principals have little leverage over multi-task agencies, but the subsequent
11
15 This intuition is quite robust across models that consider ex ante budget controls and agency policy
preferences.  Silver (1996) examines a continuous, unidimensional outcome space.  Bendor and Moe (1985) study a
simulation model with boundedly rational agencies.
section shows how ex post inducements can alter this conclusion.
3.  The Separation and Consolidation Subgames
I now develop some preliminary results for each subgame that will both establish some
intuition and serve as the basis for P’s optimal jurisdictional allocation.
The Separation Subgame
Because P’s payoffs are additively separable across agencies and agencies cannot transfer
utility amongst themselves, I focus on the equilibrium strategies between P and a single,
separated agency, Ai.  Given a budget Bi and contract (βi
0, βi
1), Ai maximizes uAi(φi; Bi, (βi
0, βi
1))
subject to Bi ≥ ci(φi).  This problem is strictly concave, so the first-order condition is sufficient
for characterizing the maximum.  Solving for the constrained maximum:
φ β β
β β
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Now consider P’s problem.  Two observations simplify the problem considerably.  First, βi
0 = 0.
It is clear from [1] that only the difference in payments, βi
1 – βi
0, matters in Ai’s decision; thus,
for any contract such that βi
1 > 0 and βi
0 > 0, P could do strictly better by reducing both payments
by min{βi
0, βi
1}.  But any contract such that βi
1 = 0 and βi
0 > 0 cannot be optimal, since Ai would
choose a weakly higher policy for lower payments if βi
0 = 0.  Thus, as intuition would suggest, P
will never reward the agency for a failure.
Second, case (i) (the budget-constrained case) obtains if and only if φi
A > φi
P.  To see this,
suppose that φi
A > φi
P.  Then as in the no-contracting case, P could obtain her ideal policy simply
by choosing a zero contract and a budget equal to the cost of her ideal policy (Bi = ci(φi
P)),
resulting in case (i).  If φi
A ≤ φi
P, then by the concavity of uAi(•), (i) may only obtain if duAi(φi
*)/dφi
> 0.  But if this were the case, then P could reduce βi
1 so that duAi(φi
*)/dφi = 0.  With this revised
contract, P would receive the same policy choice φi
* for a strictly lower payment.  Thus, when φi
A
≤ φi
P, Ai’s ideal policy is always fully funded, though P may use a contract to induce a new
(higher) ideal policy.




































Solving, we find that βi
1* = (1 – 2(wi – zi))/3 at an interior solution.  Substituting back into the
previous expressions yields the following characterization.
Comment 1.  The unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategies for each









































































































































0* = 0.  •
In equilibrium, contracts are used to induce Ai to choose a higher policy only for
moderate values of wi – zi.  In the other cases, outcomes are identical to the no-contracting game.
For wi – zi ≤ –1, any contract that can induce Ai to choose a non-zero policy is too expensive for
P.  For wi – zi ≥ 1/2, the policy Ai would have chosen in the absence of a contract is good enough
for P not to use a contract.  In this case, ex ante budget control is all that is necessary to secure an
adequate policy.
The Consolidation Subgame
Turning to the consolidation subgame, given a budget B and contract βC, A maximizes
uA(φ1
C, φ2
C; BC, βC) subject to BC ≥ c(φC).  This problem is also strictly concave, so the first-order
condition is sufficient for characterizing the maximum.  Solving for the constrained maximum:
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[2]
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint, which equals zero when BC ≥ c(φC*).
This expression makes clear the relation between the policy selection problem in the two
subgames: compared to [1], A’s choice in each dimension depends not only on the benefit of
performing that task, but potentially also on her performance of the other task.  From [2], it is
easily seen that the “first-order” effect of increasing A’s payment from a success in one task
(e.g., β11 or β10 for task 1) is to increase his effort along that dimension.  However, increasing β10
also decreases A’s incentive to produce along task 2, and increasing β01 similarly hinders his
performance on task 1.  Intuitively, then, each contractual payment has the effect of shifting the
policy curve toward directions that are rewarded, and away from directions that are not.
Expression [2] also makes clear why at least one payment must be zero in equilibrium.
An equal shift in all of the payments does not affect A’s policy choice, and hence a contract with
strictly positive payments cannot be optimal.  Beyond this intuition, closed-form solutions for the
equilibrium contracts and policies are unfortunately difficult to derive, especially when φi
A ≥ φi
P
for some task i.16  However, this difficulty will not hinder the derivation P’s choice of
jurisdictional allocation.  This is because a simple but important class of contracts, which I call
independent contracts, facilitates comparisons between P’s payoffs in the two subgames.
Independent contracts are simply those which specify payments for each task that do not
depend on the outcome of the other task.  Because there are only two outcomes for each
separated agency, their contracts are necessarily independent.  For a consolidated agency, a
contract is independent if β11 = β10 + β01 – β00.  Inspection of [1] and [2] reveals that such a
contract induces identical unconstrained ideal policies for A and each Ai if β10 – β00 = β1
1 – β1
0
and β01 – β00 = β2
1 – β2
0.  But a consolidated agency may also receive a non-independent contract.
P could thus offer A an additional inducement for producing two successes, by choosing β11 > β10
+ β01 – β00.  The next comment establishes that non-independence is a basic requirement for
inducing a consolidated agency to perform better than its separated counterparts.
Comment 2.  If contracts are independent, then P weakly prefers to separate
tasks.  •
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16 When φA ≤ φP, P would never try to induce a budget-constrained policy (i.e., she does not use ex ante
control), and hence λ = 0.  The closed form for equilibrium policies can then be derived by solving [2].
The intuition behind this result is straightforward.  With an independent contract, A’s
marginal utility for each task is unaffected by her effort on the other task.  The consolidated
agency’s incentives can thus be duplicated by presenting separate agencies with essentially the
same contract.  So, critical to consolidation is P’s ability to choose non-independent contracts for
that agency.  Such contracts link A’s payments across tasks, in effect creating externalities from
the performance of each.
4.  Optimal Jurisdiction Allocation
The preceding development suggests that, in contrast to the conclusion of Proposition 1,
jurisdictional arrangements can matter.  If the principal can credibly commit to a non-
independent contract, it is no longer obvious that separation should always be chosen.  I now
complete the backwards induction analysis of the game by characterizing P’s task allocation
decision.  This is done simply by deriving conditions under which the payoff from one subgame
will be superior to that from the other.
Separated Agencies
I first examine conditions under which P chooses separate agencies.  The first result
addresses the case where the agency or agencies have higher policy ambitions than P for at least
one task.  There are two cases to consider.  When φA ≥ φP, P does at least as well by separating
agencies because this allows her to allocate resources optimally.  As with the no-contracting
case, P can obtain her optimal policy at a minimum cost with no contractual payment.  Budgetary
controls alone are sufficient for making agencies fully pliant.
When φi
A ≥ φi
P for only task i, matters are more complicated.  In this situation, a
consolidated agency disagrees with P not so much over the “quantity” of policy, but over the
distribution of resources across tasks.  P can induce A to choose policies closer to her ideal by
providing contractual inducements, and consolidation may help a bit by providing a wider range
of such inducements.  However, P may more easily prevent an excessive allocation of resources
toward task i by simply separating the agencies.  Proposition 2 combines these two cases.
Proposition 2.  If φi
A ≥ φi
P (alternately, if wi – zi ≥ 1) for some task i, then P
separates tasks.  •
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The result is proved by showing that φi
A ≥ φi
P for some i, then P can find a contract for
separate agencies that does at least as well as that for a consolidated agency.  The intuition is
straightforward: for any such task i, P can receive her ideal policy simply by offering a budget Bi
= ci(φi
P), without any contractual payment.  This implies that if φA ≥ φP, P can achieve her ideal
outcome across both tasks.  But if φj
A < φj
P for j ≠ i, then Aj can be induced to choose the same
policy as A would by offering them both the same expected payment for a success on task j.
Thus, the contracts for separated agencies will be more efficient than that for a consolidated
agency, as the inducements for good performance on task j do not impose any externalities on
the performance of task i.
There exists a “small” set of preference configurations under which P will be indifferent
between the two structures.  For example, if φA ≥ φP and φP lies along A’s policy curve, then P
can of course achieve her ideal outcome with a consolidated agency.  In addition, if φi
A is only
slightly larger than φi
P and φj
A (j ≠ i) is sufficiently low, then P may do as well with a
consolidated agency.  As the proof demonstrates, however, P’s preference for separation is strict
over a wide range of parameters.
Consolidated Agencies
When will P consolidate?  Under the conditions of Proposition 2, a consolidated agency
would allocate its resources in a way not desired by P.  By separating the agencies, P could
receive her ideal in at least one dimension without a contract, and the displacement of effort is
reduced.
When these conditions do not obtain; that is, when φA < φP, P cannot receive her ideal
policy on any dimension without a contract.  In this case, budgetary controls are insufficient for
attaining a policy closer to φP.  Here a non-independent contract can be useful, since it can give
A an added incentive to increase his effort on both tasks simultaneously.  The following result
shows that this possibility causes P to prefer consolidation.
Proposition 3.  If φA < φP (alternately, if wi – zi < 1 for all tasks i) then P
consolidates tasks.  •
Intuitively, when φA < φP, A’s preferences differ with P’s over the extent, rather than the
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distribution, of policy.  As a result, an independent contract can be designed for a consolidated
agency that duplicates the incentives of separated agencies.  With a non-independent contract, P
can do even better, inducing A to choose a superior policy vector more efficiently than separated
agencies would.  Again, there is a set of preference configurations under which P will be
indifferent between the two organizational forms.  These occur when wi – zi are sufficiently low
for all i.17  In such cases, P would offer no contractual payments under either structure, and thus
the trivial outcome of zero budgets and policy levels result.
Figure 3 graphically depicts Propositions 2 and 3.  The graph plots task assignments as a
function of φA.  Since φA is defined by wi – zi, the graph is also in effect a plot of P’s choice as a
function of wi – zi ∈  [0, 2mi] for both tasks i.













Figure 4 presents a numerical example of the jurisdiction game, where the cost function is
c(φ) = 2φ1
2 + φ2
2 and z1 = z2 = 0.  The graph plots principal utility in each subgame for three
17
17 As the proof of Proposition 3 shows, if wi – zi > –1 for all i, then the preference is strict.
values of w2 (0.25, 0.75, and 1.5) as a function of w1, which ranges from 0 to 4.
Figure 4: Comparing Jurisdictional Assignments
The calculations are fully consistent with the results derived above.  As Proposition 3
predicts, for both w2 = 0.25 and w2 = 0.75, consolidation is preferred for w1 < 1.  As Proposition 2
predicts, for w2 = 1.5 or w1 > 1, P separates the tasks.  In the case where w2 = 1.5, P is indifferent
only in the knife-edge case where w1 = 1.5.  Here, the consolidated agency’s preferences differ
with P’s only in the extent, and not the distribution, of policy.  P’s ideal lies along the policy
curve, and thus by limiting the budget appropriately, P does equally well under either task
allocation.  Finally, in all cases, as w1 increases beyond 1, A’s preferences over the allocation of
resources across tasks diverge increasingly from P’s.  Consolidation then becomes progressively
worse, while separation promises a constant payoff.
The examples also give a sense of the optimal contracts in the consolidation subgame.
For example, in the w2 = 1.5 case, all contractual payments are zero except for β
10, which is
positive and decreasing for low values of w1.  When w1 is low, raising β
10 is the most efficient
means for offsetting A’s strong preference for devoting resources toward task 2.  Similarly, in
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the w2 = 0.25 case, β
01 is increasing in w1 so that P can maintain A’s interest in performing task 2.
5.  Empirical Implications
The model may be applied to a range of task allocation issues.  For example, in the
American military, debate has persisted over the Army and Marine Corps’ role in the provision
of air support for ground troops (also known as CAS, for Close Air Support).  Reformers have
often suggested that the current system, under which each of the four military services runs its
own “air force,” is redundant and wasteful (Builder 1989).  However, this model provides a
rationale for such a setup.  Both the Army and Marines have a strong preference for CAS by
virtue of their primary missions: the deployment of ground forces.  These missions typically
require fliers to operate in close concert with ground forces in order to deliver munitions
sometimes no more than a few hundred yards from friendly troops.  In fact, Marine pilots receive
training both as infantry and often also as “Forward Air Controllers,” or ground personnel who
direct air strikes.  The Air Force, by contrast, has a less direct commitment to support ground
forces, and has therefore traditionally stressed the destruction of targets farther from the line of
battle.  This task, known as “battlefield air interdiction” (BAI), has numerous attractions, as it
emphasizes strategic (as opposed to tactical) gains, requires larger and more expensive aircraft,
requires less inter-service coordination, and carries less risk of friendly casualties.
How might the Air Force react if given the CAS role?  A consolidated agency with a
strong predilection for one task (i.e., BAI) over another (i.e., CAS) can be expected to divert
resources away from the latter toward the former.  As Proposition 2 suggests, the principal would
be better off separating the tasks across agencies.  By contrast, both the Army and Marine Corps
have a relatively high demand for CAS, along with their traditional roles of deploying ground
forces.  These services would likely suffer fewer allocative distortions between CAS and their
other tasks, and to the extent that Congress agrees with these goals, the consolidation of these
tasks is sensible.  Thus, despite the apparent overlap of hardware, the existing integrated air-
ground force structures in the Army and Marines can be expected to perform better than one in
which the Air Force handled all military aircraft.
The model is also amenable to a more rigorous analysis.  It predicts variations in the
assignment of new tasks, as well as the rearrangement of existing jurisdictions, depending on
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Congress’ and the agencies’ relative demands for bureaucratically-provided services.  In
particular, two of the most straightforward hypotheses are as follows:
(H1)  Agencies will be created for new tasks when they are higher demanders
than Congress; new tasks will be folded into existing agencies if they are lower
demanders.
(H2)  Agencies will merge when they are lower demanders than Congress;
agencies will be split when they are higher demanders.18
Examples of H1 include the formation of the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s investigation of organized crime.  Examples of H2 include the
1947 split of the US Army in to the modern Air Force and Army, and the 1958-1960
consolidation of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the Naval Research
Laboratory, and the Army Ballistic Missile Agency’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory and
Developments Operation Division into the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Simple tests of both hypotheses can be constructed using data on presidential preferences
(as a crude measure of agency demand) and median congressional roll call scores.  The latter can
be augmented with the composition of relevant legislative committees and, in some
specifications, party control.  Additionally, measures of each agency’s demand can be refined
even further by considering its institutional setting; for example, highly insulated agencies (e.g.,
independent commissions) created by liberal coalitions might more effectively resist
conservative presidents.  For the dependent variables, data on bureaucratic reorganization (for
H2) and the assignment of new tasks (H1) can be compiled from surveys of significant
legislation (e.g., Mayhew 1991).
6.  Conclusions
It has long been recognized that bureaucratic responsibilities are not haphazardly
distributed, but rather serve specific political goals.  Beyond this insight, however, little is known
about a wide variety of circumstances under which legislatures face the challenge of assigning
tasks to organizations.  The theory developed here addresses the issue by examining an
20
18 A more refined hypothesis consistent with Proposition 2 is that a multi-task agency will be split when it
is high demander for at least one task.
environment in which the bureaucracy may disagree with a legislature over the expenditure of
resources across tasks.  To improve bureaucratic compliance under uncertainty, the legislature
may use budgets as ex ante constraints on feasible policies, and contracts as ex post inducements
for better performance.  This setup corresponds to the actual budgeting process more closely than
those of standard contracting models.
The model derives intuitive predictions about task assignments.  In equilibrium,
consolidation allows principals to link inducements across tasks, thus giving an agency greater
incentive to choose higher policies for all tasks.  Separation prevents the allocative distortions
that are possible when agencies control multiple tasks.  As a result, when a principal prefers
higher policy levels than the agencies on all tasks, tasks will be consolidated.  Otherwise, tasks
will be separated.  In this situation, the principal can achieve her ideal policy on at least one
dimension at minimum cost, and this performance is insulated from that of the other task.
Future research should expand on the model in several directions.  An immediate
extension would be to make agencies more active participants in the task allocation process.
Among other things, this would allow a formalization of Wilson’s (1989) logic for why agencies
protect their “turf.”  In its current form, the model suggests a rationale for why even budget-
maximizing agencies would resist new tasks: in equilibrium a legislature will add tasks to realize
efficiency gains, and these gains come at the expense of agency contractual payments.  If, in
addition to choosing policies, agencies could offer the legislature inducements for favorable
treatment or exploit asymmetric information about their production technology, then they may
resist unfavorable tasks or compete over favorable ones.  The extended model could then serve
as a basis for an equilibrium theory of when and how agencies expand, and of how an
endogenous preference for turf might arise.
A second set of extensions should address the policy-making context.  For example, the
policy environment may be enriched to suit specific policy areas better.  Such generalizations
might include more dimensions, fixed or non-separable costs, and correlations in success
probabilities across policy dimensions.  But most importantly, the bureaucracy’s institutional
context deserves closer scrutiny.  The legislature may be given a broader set of choices over a
new agency’s type (e.g., independent commissions versus departmental agencies) or
departmental home (which may affect the agency preferences).  Finally, since new jurisdictions
21
are often accompanied by new principals, the model can be usefully adapted to flesh out the
implications of common agency for the assignment of tasks.
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Appendix
Proposition 1.  In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the n-task, no-contracting jurisdictional
allocation game, P separates tasks.
Proof.  Consider three cases.  For convenience, I abuse notation for uP(•) to reflect the zero
contracts in the obvious manner.  First, if φA ≤ φP, then φA is the equilibrium policy under both
regimes, so uP(B*; φ*(B*)) = uP(BC*; φC*(BC*)).
Second, if φP < φA, then φP may only be chosen if φP = φC*(BC) for some BC.  If there exists
such a BC, then uP(B*; φ*(B*)) = uP(BC*; φC*(BC*)); otherwise, uP(B*; φ*(B*)) > uP(BC*; φC*(BC*)).
Third, without loss of generality, suppose that for i ∈  {1, …, j}, φi
A < φi
P, and for i ∈  {j +
1, …, n}, φi
A ≥ φi




P).  By the convexity of c(•) and additive
separability of utility functions,
uP(B*; φ*(B*)) ≥ uP(c(φ); φ)  for all φ ≤ φ*. [3]
Thus if φC* ≤ φ*, uP(B*; φ*(B*)) ≥ uP(BC*; φC*(BC*)).  If not, then φk
C* > φk
* for some k ∈  {j + 1, …,







otherwise (so that φC' ≤ φ*).  Then for each such k, P receives φk
C' – ck(φk
C') under policy vector
φC', and φk
C* – ck(φk







By the additive separability of utility functions, we obtain: uP(c(φC'); φC') ≥ uP(BC*; φC*(BC*)).
However, φC' ≤ φ*, so by [3], uP(B*; φ*(B*)) ≥ uP(c(φC'); φC').  Combining expressions, uP(B*;
φ*(B*)) ≥ uP(BC*; φC*(BC*)).  Therefore, P chooses to separate tasks.  •
Comment 1 and Proof.  This result is by derivation in the text.  •
Comment 2.  If contracts are independent, then P weakly prefers to separate tasks.
Proof.  It is sufficient to show that if βC satisfies β11 = β10 + β01 – β00, all outcomes under
consolidation can be replicated with separate agencies.  Substituting into uA(φC; BC, βC) and
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simplifying, A’s objective under an independent contract is:
uA(φC; BC, βC) = Σi [wiφi
C + zi(1 – φi
C) – mi(φi
C)2] + BC
+ (β10 – β00)φ1
C + (β01 – β00)φ2
C + β00.
Let φC* be A’s solution to this problem.  Now suppose that P offers each separated agency
Ai a budget ci(φi
C*) and the following contracts: β1
1 = β10 – β00, β2
1 = β01 – β00, β1
0 = 0, and β2
0 = 0.
Then ∂uA/∂φi = du
Ai/dφi for each task i.  By the concavity of all agency objective functions, for
any task such that φi
* > 0, ∂uA(φi
C*)/∂φi ≥ 0.  Hence, du
Ai(φi
C*)/dφi ≥ 0 and Ai would choose φi
C* if
offered budget ci(φi
C*).  For any task such that φi
C* = 0, Ai would clearly choose φi
C* if offered
budget ci(φi




1, β01 ≥ β2
1, and β00 ≥ β1
0 + β2
0, the total payments to A1 and A2 for any outcome are
weakly less than the payment to A.  Thus φC* may be implemented by separated agencies at
weakly less cost and weakly lower contractual payment than with a consolidated agency.  •
Proposition 2.  If φi
A ≥ φi
P (alternately, if wi – zi ≥ 1) for some task i, then P separates tasks.
Proof.  There are two cases.  First suppose that φA ≥ φP.  Then by Comment 1, if P chooses




0* = 0, and φi
* = φi
P, for each
Ai.  P therefore weakly prefers to separate tasks.  This preference is strict unless A would choose
φC*(BC, βC) = φP when BC = c(φP) and βC = 0.  To determine conditions under which this is
possible, consider A’s maximization problem.  There are five constraints; (i) BC ≥ c(φ), (ii) φ1 ≤
1, (iii) φ2 ≤ 1, (iv) φ1 ≥ 0, and (v) φ2 ≥ 0.  Because it is assumed that φ
A ≥ φP and φP < 1, (ii)-(v)
are slack, and I disregard them.  Given budget BC and βC = 0, A’s Lagrangian is:
L = Σi [wiφi + zi(1 – φi) – miφi








i i i i i iw z m m= − − − ≤2 2 0,
so that φ1 = φ2m2(w1 – z1)/(m1(w2 – z2)).  Since φ
P = φA when w1 – z1 = w2 – z2 = 1, φ
C*(c(φP), βC =
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0) = φP only if w1 – z1 = w2 – z2 ≥ 1.  This is clearly a measure zero case.




P.  I first establish
two necessary conditions for consolidation to be preferred to separation.
Claim 1: P prefers consolidation only if φ1
C* = φ1
P.  Suppose not.  I construct contracts for
separated agencies such that φ1
C* = φ1
P that result in strictly superior outcomes for P.  Define
contracts (β1', β2') so that β1
0' = β1
1' = β2
0' = 0, and β2
1' = max{0, (β01* – β00*)(1 – φ1
C*) + (β11* –
β10*)φ1
C*}.  Then by [1] and [2], for budgets B1 = c1(φ1
P) and B2 = c2(φ2
C*), A1 and A2 choose φ1
P
and φ2
C*, respectively.  P thus receives a strictly superior policy and budget combination with
separate agencies.  P also makes lower expected contractual payments with separated agencies if:
β2
1' = 0 or φ2
C*[(β01* – β00*)(1 – φ1
C*) + (β11* – β10*)φ1









C*, or β00*(1 – φ1
C*) + β10*φ1
C* ≥ 0, which holds trivially.
Contradiction.  Thus P prefers separation if φ1
C* ≠ φ1
P.
Claim 2: P prefers consolidation only if φ2
C* = φ2





P.  By choosing β2' as defined above, P can induce A2 to choose φ2
C*
with the same expected contractual payments as in the consolidation subgame.  But since P
ideally prefers a contract inducing A2 to choose φ2
*, she prefers separation: contradiction.
Thus consolidation can only be preferred by P if φC* = φ* (note that φ1
P = φ1
*).  Since φ* is
achieved with the minimal budget and expected contractual payment under separation, separation





Note finally that if w2 – z2 > 1/2, the preference for separation is strict.  In this case, P
makes no contractual payments under separation, but since φ* ≠ φC*(BC; βC = 0) for any budget
BC, a positive contractual payment is necessary to induce A to choose φ*.  •
Proposition 3.  If φA < φP (alternately, if wi – zi < 1 for all tasks i) then P consolidates tasks.
Proof.  It is sufficient to show that P does at least as well under the consolidation subgame as
under the separation subgame.  Let Bi
*, βi
*, and φi
* represent the equilibrium strategies in the
separation subgame.  Now let P offer budget BC' = B1
* + B2
* and the following contract βC' to the
consolidated agency, A: β00' = 0, β10' = β1
1*, β01' = β2
1*, and β11' = β1
1* + β2
1*.  Then A’s objective
is: uA(φ; BC', βC') = Σi [wiφi + zi(1 – φi) – miφi
2] + BC' + β1
1*φ1 + β2
1*φ2.  Since u
A(•) is concave,
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first-order conditions are sufficient to characterize a maximum.  A would therefore choose, if
feasible, φi
C' = max{0, (wi – zi + βi
1*)/2mi}.  By Comment 1, φi
C' = φi
* for all tasks i.  Thus, φi
C' is
feasible under budget BC'.  P therefore receives the same utility by offering budget BC' and
contract βC' in the consolidation game as she receives in equilibrium of the separation subgame.
Therefore, P weakly prefers to consolidate tasks.
I show finally that if additionally wi – zi > –1 for all tasks i, this preference is strict.
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Substituting from Comment 1, 1 + β10' – 2m1φ1
C' > 0 if w1 – z1 < 1, and likewise 1 + β
01' – 2m2φ2
C'
> 0 if w2 – z2 < 1.  Thus ∂u
P/∂β11 > 0 if ∂φi
C*/∂β11 > 0 for all i.  Now ∂φ1












.= − + '
Then by Comment 1, ∂φ1
C*/∂β11 > 0 for w2 – z2 > –1.  A symmetric statement obtains for
∂φ2
C*/∂β11.  Thus if wi – zi ∈  (–1, 1) for all tasks i, ∂u
P(βC', •)/∂β11 > 0.  P would achieve a higher
utility by choosing β11 > β1
1* + β2
1*: contradiction.  Therefore βC' cannot be the optimal contract,
and P can achieve a strictly higher utility under consolidation than with the optimal contract
under separation.  •
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